What should we be concerned with most? We might begin by speculating from common intuitions. The carnally-minded may say that making it, that is, acquiring a great deal of wealth and influence, is the highest calling of man. Others, of the more existentialist variety, may suggest that finding personal fulfillment in life, or in the purpose that one sets themselves out to, is that of central importance. Others still may value family above all else, and perhaps more generally, the preservation of humanity writ large. And yet some, namely the nihilists, suppose that the question is a foolish one to ask, suggesting that meaning, importance, even the very notion of ought, are themselves illusory.

The question is an inherently difficult one to answer, for in our everyday value judgments, we reach these judgments by contrasting the common things against what we deem important. A man decides between preparing a home-cooked meal and ordering fast food. If this man values his physiological well-being, he will choose the home-cooked meal. But suppose also this man values his time. Suddenly, the choice of which meal to eat is reduced to a decision between contending values: his health or his hours. To resolve this, he must decide which he values more. This will often defer to even higher values. For instance, if he values honor and integrity, he may also value his health, that he may be capable for those that he loves. Conversely, if he values his ambition, and achieving his desires, he may place a greater emphasis on his time. But suppose that he is aiming for a balance, wherein one day he may choose the former, and on another, choose the latter. Then his value for balance becomes the guiding principle as he delegates some days to his ambition and others to his health. All in all, with each of these decisions, increasingly complex and nuanced, he defers to higher and higher values. After all, why should the man value balance? Is moderation not a means to an end toward living a healthy life? Why should he desire a healthy life? Because healthiness is more pleasurable than unhealthiness? Why then should he seek pleasure? Each successive question breaks into a new layer of the man's desires. So then, what happens at the highest, where the decision to make is what ought to be there in the first place? What value system may be deferred to in asking such a question?

Let us approach this more rigorously. Let's assume, for the sake of argument, that family is the most important thing. Under this assumption, protecting your family, seeking their good, and fulfilling their desires, they come second to nothing. But we must appreciate the gravity of such an assumption. Suppose that your mother held in deep disregard the neighbor across the street. Your neighbor's mere presence irks her to no end. In fact, as long as he is alive, your mother's hatred of him gives her physical pain. As family is the most important thing, and this includes your mother, then is there any fault in disposing of the neighbor? What limit is there to impose besides the will of your family? One might object and suggest that, even for family, we ought not to take a life. But this violates the original assumption, that family is the most important thing, and places the sanctity of human life above it. It's worth noting that this doesn't imply that human life is not important, but merely that it must be, as per the assumption, strictly less important than family. As egregious as it may appear to place family above the sanctity of human life, it is yet logically conceivable.

But suppose instead that your mother had a different outlook, that she had a deep regard for her neighbor, all of her neighbors, even extending to all humanity, supposing that human life is sacred and valuable. Suppose she cares for her neighbors with such a deep regard as to even put them before her own family. Given that family is the most important thing, and this would include satisfying the desires of your family, in order to fulfill them and make them happy, then it should be so that she be allowed, encouraged even, to pursue the well-being of her neighbors, even to the expense or detriment of her family. But if indeed family is the most important thing, then nothing may be done to their detriment. The paradox is clear. The mother's own desires are contrary to what matters most. But satisfying her desires are necessary to what matters most. As it stands, this is unresolvable. But suppose one permits an exception, that the desires of your mother ought to be satisfied insofar as they are not contrary to the fact that family is the most important thing. But this raises the question, as to whether family itself, or the fact that family is the most important thing, is the most important thing. And these are not equivalent! If your mother is not permitted to desire things contrary to that fact, then she, indeed, the whole family, is subordinate to the fact itself.

More broadly speaking, if a given thing matters most, then the fact that it matters most is less important than the thing itself. But the thing only matters most if the fact yet remains, and seeing as the thing is our first concern, we are not as concerned with the fact of what comes first. This is to say, we care less about what comes first than we care about the thing that comes first. By putting the thing above the fact, the fact is undermined, and rules out the thing being there to begin with. The only thing that could take that spot then is the one thing which is also the fact, namely truth itself. Therefore, truth itself must be the most important thing, and the pursuit of the truth, the highest calling of man. But what is truth? At its most basic, it is that which differentiates that which is from that which is not. Even supposing the most nihilistic interpretations, even supposing that our minds cannot comprehend reality or reason, this aspect of truth, that it dictates that which is, is a necessary quality. As there are things which do and do not exist, there exists a fact, a truth regarding them. So the truth both exists necessarily, and is necessarily the thing which matters most.

But must there be a most important thing at all? Are not value and importance qualities produced by the human mind? Do we not attribute these things to that which is common? As discussed prior, is not a value system merely for the purpose of making a decision? But is not a value system present in the decision-making process of all rational agents? In the absence of any value system, the decision would no longer be rational, but whimsical, dare I say random. A value system is necessary for a rational agent to function as such. Is it then a disqualified question to ask concerning value systems themselves, and which ones are preferable to others? Certainly not, as such a disqualification presupposes that something ought not to be, which itself presupposes a value system of its own. So, rational agents are free to question concerning value systems, and discern between them, which naturally concerns even higher value systems. Continued recursively, a zenith is reached at the heart of rationality itself, which is concerned with truth itself. Rationality, of course, is concerned with what is, and making decisions on this basis of what is. And truth itself is what is. And so, if indeed we are rational agents—which should seem self-evident as far as the epistemology goes, as we are concerned with what is—then indeed what is, that is, the truth, must be the most important thing. It may also be framed in this manner, that:

The Truth is that the Truth is.

Now, seeing as the pursuit of truth is the highest calling of man, a stark contrast is drawn between those who love the truth and those who do not. Those who love the truth seek to know the world for what it really is, and they will not be contented with a lie or a delusion. But those who do not love the truth, they value this or that thing over the way things really are. For every truth they do not seek, they will believe a lie in its place. For those who would rather have a delusion than reality, it is, at some level, not worth engaging them. Seeing as reason is concerned with matters of truth, reason may only convince those already concerned with truth. So if someone does not already love the truth, you cannot reason with them that they should do so. Beyond these, you have those who, despite believing a lie, are so persuaded that they have the truth that they are unwilling to change. These are a reminder that we must pursue the truth in all humility, not presuming to know that which we do not in this increasingly confusing world. And to prevent us from becoming conceited and stubborn, let us constantly test ourselves against each other, to reason with one another on these matters of truth. For if we do not test our reason, where is our assurance that we have any truth at all?